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A PROBLEM IN FEDERAL STAFF WORK
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Partner in law firm of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl
of New York City; Harvard, A.B., 1919; A.M., 1920; LL.B., 1922.
Formerly: Executive Officer to the Assistant Secretary of War for Air
with the rank of Brigadier General; participated in the creation of the
Air Coordinating Committee, serving as alternate and later as representative of the War Department; in 1946 appointed Personal Representative of the President with rank of Minister to negotiate in the Middle
East and in India bilateral air transport agreements and other air matters for the United States.

M

UCH has been written and spoken in recent years on the subject of the policies, or alleged lack of policies, of the federal
government in the field of domestic and international aviation. Divergent views on many questions involved are sincerely and tenaciously
held by able men in private and public life. At the present time two
separate commissions, one appointed by the President and one by the
Congress, are charged with the duty of studying the entire problem.'
The reports of these committees will undoubtedly help to clarify
our thinking, and to reduce the number of future trials and errors.
However, it is to be hoped that their members will bear in mind that
it would be an audacious group indeed who would attempt today to
prescribe a complete set of international and domestic air policies for
the United States for the next generation, or even for the next decade.
Our experience in the air world is still too limited, and the relevant
circumstances are changing too rapidly, to make any fixed blueprint
possible.
The fact that for which we cannot yet hope to find-quick or permanent solutions for most of the problems emphasizes the importance of
one aspect of the situation that is too often overlooked.. In the everchanging field of aviation it is at least as necessary for us to consider the
establishment of proper governmental procedure for the future formu-

1

1 President's temporary Air Policy Commission, appointed July 18, 1947:
Thomas K. Finletter, Chairman; George P. Baker, Vice Chairman; Palmer Hoyt;
Henry Ford II (succeeded by John A. McCome); and Arthur D. Whiteside. See
Official Letter of Appointment, 14 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE, 364.
Congressional Aviation Policy Board: Senator Owen Brewster, Chairman;
Senators Homer E. Capehart, Albert W. Hawkes, Edwin C. Johnson, Ernest W.
McFarland; Representatives Alfred L. Bulwinkle, Carl Hinshaw, Paul J. Kilday,.
Karl Stefan, Charles A. Wolverton. See Public Law 287, establishing the Board,
14 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE, 365.
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lation, development and execution of our air policies as it is to attempt
now to forecast what those policies should be. The brief discussion
that follows is devoted to this somewhat duller problem of organization
and staff work, with particular reference to the merits and demerits
of the present machinery established to deal with it. No attempt will
be made to explore substantive policies except to the extent that they
may be used to illustrate the necessity for a plan that will afford the best
means of developing a sound federal aviation program, and modifying it
from time to time as necessity or experience dictates.
I. EXISTING FEDERAL AGENCIES

The difficulties that have confronted the United States in formulating its air policies have been twofold. The first arises from the
very nature of the subject matter: the art is relatively new, its importance has mpunted and is still mounting in geometric progression, and
precedents are of less value than they may at first superficially appear.
The second is the result of the particular way in which aviation responsibilities are divided among the various departments and agencies
of the federal government. In order to appreciate this latter aspect it
is not necessary to do more than to review the existing structure in
brief detail. The table presented on the following page is doubtless not
complete, but it will give a rough idea of the extent to which the interests are scattered:
Perhaps the pattern shown by the table should be further explained:
The existing federal machinery for the regulation of commercial
air transportation is in large part embodied in the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938. In general, its objectives are "the encouragement and
development of an air transportation system properly adapted to the
present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of
2
the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense."
It is patterned in part after the Interstate Commerce Act and the Motor
Carrier Act; the certification of routes, the regulation of tariffs, of interlocking relationships and other economic matters present somewhat
similar situations in the three forms of transportation.
The 1938 Act, as modified by certain Reorganization Plans issued
pursuant to the Reorganization Act of 1939, provides two major civil
aviation agencies. The first is the Civil Aeronautics Board (the CAB),
a quasi-judicial commission of five members, placed under the Department of Commerce for budgeting, accounting, personnel procurement
and housekeeping purposes, but otherwise completely independent.
It reports directly to the President, to whose approval are subject its
decisions regarding the establishment of foreign routes for our international carriers and the issuance of permits authorizing foreign air
carriers to engage in air transportation within the United States. In
other fields it exercises its defined jurisdiction free of the requirement
of Presidential concurrence. Its most important functions include the
2 Civil Aeronautics Act, Section 2 (a); 49 USCA, §402 (Supp. 1946).
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authorization of domestic and foreign routes, the prescription or
approval of rates and rate practices, the fixing of air-line mail compensation, the approval or disapproval of various business relations
between carriers, the determination of accounting methods, the investigation of air accidents, the issuance of safety rules and regulations,
and the making of standards -for the issuance of airman certificates,
aircraft-type production and air-carrier operating certificates.
The other agency is the Civil Aeronautics Administration (the
CAA), which is a part of the Department of Commerce and under its
jurisdiction. The CAA plans, constructs, maintains and operates the
Federal Airways System. It runs the airways traffic control system and
many navigational facilities. It plans and carries out a program of
fostering and encouraging the development of civil aviation through
schools and colleges and elsewhere, it enforces the civil air regulations
established by the CAB by examining, inspecting and rating airmen,
aircraft engines, aircraft navigation facilities and airports, and it conducts applied research in aviation matters on a broad scale.
In addition to the CAA, the Department of Commerce is also responsible for and supervises the activities of the Coast and Geodetic
Bureau,
Survey, which prepares air maps and charts, and the Weather
3
source of vital weather information for air operations.
Our military (including naval) aviation is completely separate
from civil aviation, and is now under the jurisdiction of the recently
created Department of National Defense. Within that department the
field is divided among the Department of the Air Force, the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Army.
The Air Force includes all military aviation forces, both combat
and service, not otherwise specifically assigned. It is organized, trained
and equipped by its own officers. It is responsible for the establishment of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war,
except as otherwise assigned, and also for matters pertaining to the
expansion of essential peace time components to meet the needs of
war in the air.
The Navy necessarily includes such aviation forces as are germane
to the duties and operations of the fleet and the Marine Corps. These
air units have in the past been organized, trained and equipped quite
independently of the Army Air Forces. Naval air fields, air-crew
training, aircraft procurement, maintenance and repair and a multitude of other aviation matters have been as separate from similar
activities of the AAF as their civilian counterparts were separate from
8 The extent to which the business of the Department of Commerce is today
concerned in aviation matters is somewhat indicated by the appropriations for

the current fiscal year. Out of a total appropriation for the Department of
Commerce of approximately $191,000,000, $119,000,000 is earmarked for the CAA,
$9,500,000 for the Coast and Geodetic Survey and $2,300,000 for the Weather
Bureau. The air interests of the two latter offices are of course secondary to
their main purposes.
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both Army and Navy. The extent to which this will b~e changed under
the recent reorganization of the national defense establishment remains
to be seen.
Under the new organization the Army will include the aviation
organic to its own mission, such as artillery observation planes, liaison
planes, and the like.
Two other components of the new Department of National Defense, both under the direction of its Secretary, are of importance in
the over-all picture. The Munitions Board will plan for the military
aspects of industrial mobilization (including aircraft production) and
will maintain liaison with other departments and agencies in the fields
of procurement, production and distribution. The Army and Navy,
even in peacetime, are by far the most important customers of our
aircraft manufacturing industry. The Research and Development
Board will prepare and recommend programs and policies for research
and development by the services themselves acting in connection with
outside agencies.
The Department of State has little relation to the domestic air
activities of the other departments and agencies, but it plays an active
and important part in our international air affairs. It has the responsibility of conducting all negotiations with foreign governments in the
field of aviation-bilateral or unilateral agreements for commercial
operations, agreements for military use of foreign airfields or other air
facilities, and so forth. The requirements and principles involved in
such matters may often be determined in large part by other civil or
military agencies, but they must be coordinated with the State Department so as to insure compliance with the over-all foreign policies of
the government. In addition, international aviation today is wedded
to international affairs. It is an important instrument of our foreign
policy, and the revolutionary changes that it is making in travel has
had a much deeper effect on all international relations than is sometimes realized.
The United States' member of the Council of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is appointed by the President,
but operates under the direction of the State Department. ICAO, an
associated agency of the United Nations with a present membership
of forty-two countries, was created as a result of the international
aviation conference held at Chicago in 1944. It is taking the lead in
the establishment of international standards and regulations for international civil aviation; its work is of cardinal import to many of our
departments and agencies interested in aviation matters.
The Post Office Department and the Federal Communications Commission are examples of other government agencies to which air transport is becoming of increasing import, or whose functions are of con-
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cern to aviation. Mail pay, though no longer in the nature of a subsidy
in the case of some airlines, is still lifeblood for many of them. The
dependence of air operations on radio communication is obvious.
To make the list at all complete there must be included two general
'fields which, while not parts of the federal government organization,
constitute such a basic part of our national aviation picture as to make
them of vital public interest. The first is the aircraft manufacturing
industry; the second, our domestic and international civil airlines.
The companies engaged in these enterprises are vested with a public
interest to an extent which justifies government concern for and participation in their business. Proper coordination of certain of their
functions and policies with those of the government departments referred to above is as necessary in many respects as is coordination
between the CAB and the State Department.
II.

POSSIBLE DEPARTMENTAL REORGANIZATIONS

There are various conceivable changes that might be made in the
government chart which wculd reduce the total number of air agencies
described above, and which theoretically would contribute to a more
orderly and workable grouping of air activities and responsibilities.
Most of them are not feasible today. More important from the point
of view of the main topic under discussion, even if it were practicable
to put them into effect they would not of themselves insure the formulation and coordination of over-all federal air policies. It may, nevertheless, be worthwhile to spend a moment considering what these
theoretical rearrangements could be.
A single Department of Air. Brazil and Argentina, among other
countries, have solved the problem of coordinating air policies by
putting all federal activities in that field into one government department under a single Air Minister. This department includes in each
case military as well as civil aviation, and on the military side the
situation has been further streamlined by consolidating all army and
navy air into a single air force. It is a good set-up in a country where
the air establishments are as yet small, and one would guess that it
would lend itself to the economical and efficient development of flying
in Brazil and Argentina. It would not, however, be appropriate in
the United States. For self-evident reasons the vital functions of our
military air forces must remain within the sphere of the Department
of National Defense.
A single Department of Civil Aviation. There is more to be said
for this type of organization from the point of view of our government.
England furnishes perhaps the best example of such a department,
within which are grouped all important government air functions except those that pertain to the Royal Air Force or to the Fleet Air Arm.
The British Civil Air Ministry combines in itself the air activities of
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our Department of Commerce, the CAA, the CAB and to a certain
extent the operations of our State Department in the international
civil aviation field. The Foreign Office, of course, participates in relations and negotiations with foreign governments, but to an outside
observer it would appear that it has less to do with policy determinations than the Air Ministry. Coordination between the Civil Air
Ministry and other departments in Great Britain is made at cabinet
level.
Although the formula has supporters in the United States there
are rather persuasive arguments against it. In the first place it is
doubtful whether civil aviation, important as it unquestionably is, has
as yet reached a position that would justify representation in a cabinet
that is traditionally as small as ours. Doubtless if there were a Secretary of Civil Aviation it would be logical for other interests to insist
upon the creation of a Secretary of Rail Transportation or a Secretary
of Communications. Our tendency has been away from, rather than
towards, the creation of additional federal agencies.
Secondly, this type of organization raises the very controversial
question of the position of the Civil Aeronautics Board. If the Board
is left outside the Department of Civil Aviation, and retains its present status as an independent agency, the creation of such a Department will not materially change the number of agencies we now have
in the air field. If it is included there is dange that its quasi-judicial
functions may become subject to political pressures. It is important
that in such matters its independence be preserved. On the other
hand, there are a number of duties of the Board that might safely
be transferred to a regular administrafive department - for example
those relating to air safety. Much more important, however, is the
question of the extent to which the Board should be allowed to make
high level policy decisions, not necessarily involved in the areas of
technical rulings or quasi-judicial determinations of private rights,
without any control from above or coordination with other departments.
England is not so concerned with this latter complication, for in
that country there is for all intents and purposes a single government
air line; the English Department of Civil Aviation is free of many of
the controversial questions that our numerous air transport companies
bring to the doorstep of the CAB.
A Single Department of Transportation. Such a department, if
created, might include communications and shipping, in addition to
rail, motor and air transportation. This pattern is followed in Canada and in France, and by a number of other governments. In this
country it would be subject to the same criticism as that just made,
magnified by similar problems that would arise in connection with
other quasi-judicial boards like the Interstate Commerce Commission
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and the Federal Communications Commission. However, the proponents of such a plan believe that some day we will come to it.
From the point of view of our air development there is a possibility -that civil aviation might find itself subordinated if it were only
one part of a very large government department. It is feared that
budgetary appropriations might be reduced when they came up for
consideration in conjunction with those for many non-air purposes.
Although those who believe passionately in the future of aviation in
the United States hold no great concern on this score in the long run,
it is very possibly true that in a Department of Transportation and
Communications our civil air interests might not receive in the near
future some of the attention that they now attract.
A Single Department of National Defense. This has, of course,
now been achieved. The National Security Act of 1947 provides for
a National Military Establishment which includes the Department of
the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air
Force. Under the new machinery it should be possible to coordinate
military air policies and functions and to eliminate certain duplications
that have existed in the past. The 1947 Act also creates a National
The
Security Council and a National Security Resources Board.
of
the
integration
respect
to
Council will advise the President with
domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security
so as to enable the military services and the other departments and
agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters
involving the national security. The Board will advise the President
concerning the coordination of military, industrial and civilian mobilization.
Although the creation of the National Military Establishment constitutes a great forward step, it will not eliminate the need for some
type of organization to coordinate military air activities with all of the
other air interests of the Government that have been outlined above.
III. CREATION OF THE AIR COORDINATING COMMITTEE
With so many divisions of the government concerned, and vitally
and properly concerned, in matters 'relating to the air it is not hard
to understand the problem that has confronted the executive branch
(quite apart from the inherent difficulty of the subject-matter itself)
in formulating and recommending clear-cut aviation policies, or in
coordinating action of the different departments and agencies within
the framework of such policies as have been established.
It has been traditionally and theoretically the function of the
President to settle questions that involve conflicts or overlappings
among the various departments. On major matters this has often been
done through the machinery of the Cabinet ind the Cabinet meeting,
though the extent of the practice has varied greatly from administra-
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tion to administration. The difficulty this procedure involves (and
it is by no means limited to the aviation field) is due to the fact that
the Chief Executive has never, at least in recent times, been able to
use .the Cabinet as a true staff agency. The Cabinet members are primarily occupied with the administration of their own departments
and with political matters; they are in most respects in the position of
field commanders rather than staff officers to their Commander-inChief. On most subjects coordination has been brought about by the
President personally in informal conferences with department and
agency heads, but because of the crushing demands on the President's
time, and the absence of a Cabinet secretariat or a true policy staff in
the White House organization, a deficiency has long existed in the
executive branch of our government that has from time to time been
pointed out by various official commissions and other students of the
subject.

4

The problem is accentuated by the existence of the independent
regulatory agencies created by Congress outside of the control of the
President or of any of the administrative departments. In the field
that we are considering the Civil Aeronautics Board is given by statute
certain specific policy-making powers; their exercise is subject to Presidential concurrence only in the case of the establishment of foreign
air routes and the issuance of permits to foreign carriers. As has been
indicated, the Board's independence on certain matters is important,
but on others - and the dividing line is hard to draw -

the result

could be very confusing if the independent agency did not as a matter
of comity fit major policy decisions into some over-all government pattern.
A further complication, perhaps more apparent in the field of
aviation than in any other, arises from the fact that as federal government interests and activities grow and expand many top policy determinations cannot be made without the specialized or technical knowledge that is not usually possessed either by the department heads, or
by the President, or by any of his personal White House staff.
During the war years in Washington one sometimes heard this entire situation referred to as the "breakdown" of the Cabinet system.
The description was only partly accurate. It would be better to say
that the business of government had become so intricate and manysided that the old machinery (never really suited to the problem) had
become outmoded and in need of modification and supplementation.
It was interesting to see how the active minds of the men charged
with administrative responsibility during the war years operated to fill
the deficiency that existed. Informal interdepartmental conferences
or coordinating committees, which had always existed from time to
time to a certain extent, grew rapidly in number. With respect to
4 See for example, the 1937 Report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management.
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certain matters pertaining to the conduct of the war which involved
other departments besides the military more formal organizations began to appear. One example was the so-called "Committee of Three,"
which was in fact a panel of the cabinet consisting of the Secretaries of
State, War and Navy. It met weekly to consider and decide, subject
to presidential approval, top policy questions that arose with increasing frequency as the war progressed. A second example was the State,
War and Navy Coordinating Committee (colloquially referred to as
SWNCC) which consisted of an Assistant Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. It dealt,
for the most part effectively, with a multitude of questions not of a
purely military nature relating to military government abroad, the
administration of occupied areas, our relations with neutral governments, and the like.
The need for stop-gap coordination of this type was nowhere more
obvious than in the field of aviation. The technical nature of the
subject-matter made it particularly necessary to accomplish that coordination in a body of specialists, or at least in a group that had immediate and daily access to the specialists who knew their way around
in the air.
The initial step was an informal committee, assembled at the invitation of the Secretary of State, to prepare a statement of certain
post-war air policies for the President. It operated over a period of a
couple of years under the chairmanship of Assistant Secretary of State
Berle, and included in its membership the Assistant Secretary of War
for Air, Mr. Robert A. Lovett; the Assistant Secretary of the Navy in
charge of Air Matters, Mr. Artemus L. Gates; the Under Secretary of
Commerce, Mr. Wayne Taylor; and the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, Mr. L. Welch Pogue. This committee met informally
at irregular intervals and completed the specific assignment for which
it was established.
As time went on, however, each agency concerned felt increasingly
the need of a more formal organization. This was particularly true
in the case of the two armed services. The War Department and Navy
Department secretariat, and particularly the Assistant Secretary of War
for Air, foresaw without much difficulty a multitude of serious questions pertaining to the eventual transition from war-time to peace-time
conditions. Not the least of these was the matter of our rights in airfields and airways constructed and utilized by the Air Forces, including
the Air Transport Command, during the course of the war. Another
related to the disposition of our surplus flying equipment, both civil
and military, among the many potential and eager purchasers both at
home and abroad. There were many others. In August 1944 the
matter seemed of such importance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they
dispatched a special memorandum to the Secretary of War and the
Secretary of the Navy urging their "consideration of the need for the
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establishment of an effective agency, possibly in the form of a National
Aviation Council, which, subject to such action as may later be taken
by the Congress, would advise the President on the formulation of the
national policy in regard to post-war civil aviation and on its implementation would coordinate the activities of all agencies concerned in
carrying such policy into effect, and would perform such other relevant
functions as the President might from time to time assign to it." This
paper reflected an earlier report made by the War Department on the
same general subject.
No further action was taken, however, until the early part of 1945.
In the meantime the International Convention on Civil Aviation held
at Chicago under the auspices of the United States demonstrated further that informal interdepartmental coordinating machinery, though
it could be made to work on an ad hoc basis, left a great deal to be
desired as a permanent mechanism.
In January 1945 Mr. Lovett presented a memorandum on the entire
subject to Mr. Harry Hopkins and later to the President. The Assistant Secretary of War for Air pointed out that there had been a tremendous increase during the previous year in questions relating to the
broad field of post-war international aviation; that these questions
varied from those concerning rights of transit and commercial entry
of our aircraft operating overseas to the disposal .of surplus military
and civil-type aircraft on which the future of all the manufacturing
industry depended; and that the majority of the problems arose in
connection with the anticipated transition from war to peace-time
conditions. He mentioned also the matter of determining national
air policies and plans relevant to the international civil organization to
be created as a result of the Chicago conference. The memorandum suggested the possibility of covering the situation, without the establishment of a new government agency and within the framework of existing law, by taking advantage of the machinery provided by the War
Mobilization and Reconversion Act of 1944. This Act indicated that
Congress intended that the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion should handle the over-all planning, the implementation of planning and the coordination that would be necessary with respect to
problems of the above type during the transition period.
The specific suggestion was that there be created within the Office
of War Mobilization and Reconversion an "Aviation Control Clearing Committee" to carry out, subject to the direction of the Director
of War Mobilization and Reconversion and of the President, the
duties set forth in Section 101 (c) of the Act in connection with aviation matters. These duties, under the Act, would include not only
the making and carrying out of plans and the coordination of the work
of the departments and agencies, but also the recommendation of
appropriate legislation providing authority to carry out plans which
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were developed but which were not authorized by existing law. In
order to make certain that the interests, responsibilities and views of
all agencies concerned were presented and fully considered, the Committee was to include the Secretaries of State, War, Navy and Commerce (or their Assistants specializing in air matters) and the heads
of the CAB, CAA and any other departments or agencies regarded by
the Director as having sufficient interest in the subjects involved. The
Committee was to have a full-time chairman "of top calibre," and an
appropriate staff. In situations where disagreement arose among
members of the Committee, the question in dispute was to be presented to the Director for determination, subject to coordination with
the President.
White House reaction to the proposal was favorable, but it encountered such strong opposition on the part of the State Department and
the Department of Commerce that it was killed. These departments
were fearful that the powers of the Director or of the Chairman of the
Commission (who presumably would have been a deputy to the Director) miglt improperly infringe on their duties and responsibilities.
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, with the support of its counterpart in the Navy, thereupon produced an alternative
and necessarily weaker plan which eventually ripened into the establishment on March 27, 1945, of the original Air Coordinating Committee. Instead of .an organization created pursuant to the Act of
Congress above referred to, the Committee was brought into being by
a joint Interdepartmental Memorandum signed by the Acting Secretary of State and the Secretaries of War, Navy and Commerce. The
original' members were William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of
State, who was named as Chairman; Mr. Lovett; Mr. Gates; and Mr.
William A. M. Burden, Assistant Secretary of Commerce. Mr. Theodore P. Wright,. the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics, was appointed
as the Committee's Executive Secretary. The Chairman of the Civil
Aeronautics Board would have been included in the original memorandum had it not been for the reluctance of that Board to permit
one of its members to act for it, and because of the Board's feeling that
their statutory functions might be impaired by membership. However,
within a few weeks, and at the request of the Board, the Chairman of
the CAB was added to the Committee with the express understanding
that the adherence of the Board to the project was necessarily subject
to the reservation that it could not permit itself in advance to be bound
to carry out recommendations made by the Air Coordinating Committee which involved matters which were the subject of the Board's
quasi-judicial functions.
The concern of the CAB on this latter point is a little difficult to
understand in the light of the fact that one of the basic principles contained in the Interdepartmental Memorandum was that the ACC could
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only take action by the unanimous consent of all of its members. Any
one member could veto a decision. In this way the objections raised
by the State and Commerce Departments to the earlier plan were disposed of. The theory was that after the Committee had unanimously
recommended policy for or action by any department or agency on any
subject submitted to the Committee, the necessary implementation
would result from action thereafter taken b, the individual departments in accordance with the joint decsiion.
The following subjects, listed in the Interdepartmental Memorandum "for early attention by the Committee," are set forth at
length to indicate the nature of the policy questions that had been
piling up:
In the International Field: International operating rights for

American commercial and military aircraft; operating rights in
United States territory for foreign commercial and military aircraft; rights to air bases and airways facilities, and construction,
operation and maintenance thereof; foreign problems of the Air
Transport Command and Naval Air Transport Service; assistance
to be accorded to foreign governments and foreign airlines in the
form of aviation training, technical advice, aeronautical equipment, airport construction, et cetera; establishment and operation
of navigational aids abroad for the benefit of United *States commercial and military aircraft; and instructions to be issued from
time to time to the United States representative on the Interim
Council of the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization.
In the Domestic Field: Designation and operation of federal
airways; federal assistance to states and municipalities in establishment of airports and facilities'; safety regulations; search and
rescue; communications; civil pilot training; and aviation education.
The Committee so created immediately went to work. Its staff
consisted at the beginning of a single full-time secretary, plus liaison
agents furnished by the various departments. In general it was successful. Despite weekly meetings the volume of unfinished work
multipli'ed. It adopted the policy of appointing special ad hoc committees, consisting of specialists from the various departments, to examine into and report on questions that could not be decided without
detailed study. Some of its particular accomplishments will be referred to below in more detail. Apart from the specific problems
which it resolved or attempted to resolve, however, it was by common
consent of the greatest value to its members and their respective departments because of the stimulus that it gave to their mutual education by frank and full discussions of each other's problems.
By the Summer of 1946 the work of the ACC had reached a point
which made it apparent that it would be desirable to change its organization and to strengthen its position. It was felt that the fact
that its authority rested on interdepartmental agreement rather than
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upon an executive order was a disadvantage. The matter was discussed with President Truman, who upon the recommendation of the
Committee issued Executive Order No. 9781 under date of September
19, 1946, creating a new committee of the same membership as the
original, with the addition of the Post Office Department as a regular
voting member, and with provision that other agencies not regularly
represented on the Committee might participate as voting members
in connection with aviation matters of substantial interest to them.
The Order specifically included the Bureau of the Budget as a nonvoting member. The President added to the Committee's responsibilities and strengthened its authority by directing that it "shall examine
aviation problems and developments affecting more than one participating agency; develop and recommend integrated policies to be carried
out and actions to be taken by the participating agencies or by any
other government agency charged with responsibility in the aviation
field, and, to the extent permitted by law, coordinate the aviation
activities of such agencies except activities relating to the exercise
of quasi-judicial functions."
In keeping the rule of unanimous vote, the Order also specifically
provided for the submission of important questions to the President
for decision when agreement could not be had among the members,
but only after the heads of the agencies concerned had had an opportunity to reconcile differences. Since the Order also directed the Committee to submit to the President, in addition to an annual report,
such of the Committee's recommendations on aviation policies as
might require his attention by reason of their character or importance
the effect was to give the Committee considerably more authority than
was possessed by its predecessor. The Committee was not made a
part of the President's staff nor was it dignified by being given a position as a sub-committee of the Cabinet, but it certainly moved in those
directions by becoming the President's adviser on such aviation matters
as fell within its scope.
The revised Air Coordinating Committee made several important
changes in its organization. It had become increasingly evident that
the view of the aircraft manufacturing and air transport industries, as
well as those of other private air interests, should be made known to
the government through a recognized channel. None had existed under the earlier Committee. Accordingly there was created an Industry
Advisory Panel composed of representatives of the Aircraft Industries
Association of America, the Air Transport Association of America,
the National Aeronautics Association, the Institute of Aeronautical
Sciences, the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations. The Industry Panel was asked to serve in an
advisory capacity with respect to all matters of joint interest except
those in which, for security reasons, participation was not possible.
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The Panel members were invited to submit their problems directly to
the Committee and to attend the meetings of the ACC and its subcommittees at which these and all other problems affecting their interests were to be discussed.
Where the original Committee had organized ad hoc committees
to solve each problem or group of problems as they arose, the new
Committee organized a permanent Technical Division to coordinate
technical problems in the field of air navigation within the jurisdiction
of the ACC, an Economic Division to work with the ACC's economic
and political problems, and an Industrial Division to be concerned
with the Committee's problems in the field of research, development,
production, supply and maintenance.
The Committee also organized the so-called ICAO Panel and the
Legal Subcommittee. The former is concerned, as its name indicates,
with the development of general plans for the guidance of the United
States Representative in the International Civil Aviation Organization. The latter coordinates and develops ACC's views on legislative
problems and develops United States' positions with respect to conventions in the field of international private law.
Under the Executive Order the original full-time staff of one Secretary has now been increased to a total of eighteen. The present
membership of the ACC itself consists of Mr. Garrison Norton, Assistant Secretary of State, as Chairman; Mr. James M. Landis, Chairman
of the Civil Aeronautics Board, as Co-Chairman; Mr. William C.
Foster, Under Secretary of Commerce; Mr. C. V. Whitney, Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force; Mr. John M. Brown, Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for Air; and Mr. Paul Aiken, Second Assistant Postmaster
General. The Bureau of the Budget is represented by its Assistant
Director, Mr. J. W. Jones. In cases where the foregoing are not able
to be present at meetings,, their places are taken by regular deputies.
The Executive Secretary is Mr. John Sherman, formerly of the staff
of the CAB.
The Industry Advisory Panel is composed of Mr. Eugene E. Wilson, Chairman (Chairman of the Board of Governors, Aircraft Industries Association of America) ; Admiral E. S. Land (President, Air
Transport Association of America); Mr. L. Welch Pogue (Chairman
of the Board, National Aeronautic Association) ; Mr. Frank P. Fenton
(Director of Organization, American Federation of Labor) ; Mr. R. J.
Thomas (Congress of Industrial Organizations); and Mr. Frank Caldwell (Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences).
The organization chart on the next page will give a general idea of
the way in which the Committee's work is divided, and the extent of its
sub-committees. It is obvious that it has come a long way since the
tentative beginnings in 1944 and 1945.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

S

-

0
0

0

.~

0.
0

C.

U
0
0

0

0

~
0

z

0*~*
U

0

~

C,

0

S
<<-

~,

x

0

0:
U~P

.

l

>
<

AIR COORDINATING COMMITTEE

IV.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

AND FAILURES

Before attempting to discuss the question of the future of the ACC
and changes that might be made to enable it more effectively to accomplish its purposes, it is pertinent to describe some of the subjects which
it has dealt with effectively and to comment on situations where the
machinery has apparently not worked as well.
The Demobilization of the Aircraft Industry. As the war drew to
a close it became increasingly clear to those concerned with aviation
matters in Washington that serious policy questions would be raised
by the sudden demobilization of the aircraft industry and its transition
from war-time to peace-time conditions. The story of the phenomenal
development of aircraft production between 1940 and 1945 needs no
recapitulation here; neither is it necessary to elaborate the obvious
truth, too often ignored, that no element in our future security is
more important than the preservation of a strong and virile aircraft
industry which will contain within itself the spirit, the technical skill
and the personnel that will enable it again to expand to meet the
Nation's need if the call should come.
President Truman, mindful of the situation, addressed a letter to
the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy under date of
August 8, 1945, in which he said: "It is vital to the welfare of our
people that this Nation maintain development work and the nucleus
of a producing aircraft industry capable of rapid expansion to keep
the peace and meet any emergency." In his biennial report to the
Secretary of War dated September 1, 1945, General of the Army George
C. Marshall sounded the same note in more specific language.
A survey study on the entire subject had been in progress for some
time in the Special Projects Office of the staff of the Army Air Forces.
Early in 1945 an informal interdepartmental committee was set up to
coordinate the War Department's views and plans with those of the
Navy Department and the Department of Commerce. There was at
that time no organization such as the Air Coordinating Committee, but
after the latter's organization the final report of the interdepartmental
group was appropriately turned over to the ACC. It was approved by the
ACC on October 22nd, 1945, and on October 29th was submitted to
the Special Committee on Economic Policy and Planning of the Senate.
This excellent report, after presupposing that its recommendations
with respect to maintenance and dispersal of standby plants, stockpiling of critical materials, storage of general purpose tools, and research and development programs would be carried out, addressed
itself to the problem of establishing for peacetime the lowest rate of
military aircraft production that would insure the existence of a sound
industrial nucleus capable of expansion to a full war basis. It was assumed, however, that we would have at least one year's warning before
the onset of an emergency. The report served its purpose of present-
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ing a professional analysis of the entire situation, and it was widely
used for the purpose of keeping an expansible aircraft industry in the
forefront as a vital industrial preparedness problem.
However, the recommendations of the report were not implemented. As 1946 passed and 1947 began the situation of the aircraft
manufacturers became more and more critical. The industry pressed
the Air Coordinating Committee to take the subject up again in the
light of the changed conditions. The Committee did so, and has during the past several months given it continuous attention. It created
a special "Working Committee on the Aircraft Industry" which, in
conjunction with the assistance of the Research Institute of Stanford
University specially retained for the purpose, was put to work on a
complete revision of the original report. In addition, it addressed a
letter to President Truman under date of June 17, 1947, recommending the appointment of a board of nationally prominent disinterested
citizens to make a thorough investigation of the relation of the aircraft
industry to the national defense and to our air transportation requirements. It was pointed out that the over-all situation was far more
serious than in August, 1945, and that the assumption of the 1945
report to the effect that we could count on a year's warning of any
emergency could no longer be safely made. As a result of this recommendation the President appointed, on July 18, 1947, the temporary
Air Policy Commission referred to at the outset of this article. The
President expanded the objectives of the Committee beyond those
originally suggested by the ACC, but stressed the importance of the
subject which motivated the ACC's request.
The Air Coordinating Committee is to be commended for the
steps that it has taken. The subject is a good example of the type
of activity for which the Committee was designed, and there is real
hope that its labors will bear fruit. Yet in reviewing the events since
1945 it is fair to make two observations. First, the obvious importance
of the problem might well have produced at an earlier date a more
vigorous follow-up action with respect to the recommendations of the
original report. Second, if the Air Coordinating Committee had the
prestige and strength that its position deserves it might well have been
possible for it to have done alone the very work which has now in part
been turned over to a special citizens' committee, and to have relied
on the testimony of independent outside witnesses to rebut any criticism based on alleged special interests on the part of the particular
departments concerned. The Executive Order makes it specifically
one of the duties of the Committee to submit to the President its recommendations on such aviation policies as require his attention by
reason of their importance; one might question a practice whereby
heads of government departments seek to discharge such duties by
asking the appointment of still another committee to do the work for
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them. However, under the political and other circumstances as they
existed the ACC probably took the most effective action possible.
The Work of the United States Representatives in 1CAO. Under
the Executive Order of September 19, 1946, the President made it a
duty of the Air Coordinating Committee to recommend to the Department of State "general policy directives and instructions for the guidance" of the representatives of the United States in the International
Civil Aviation Organization. These representatives include United
States delegates to the Assembly and to all other meetings under the
auspices of ICAO, as well as the United States staff permanently stationed in Montreal. As indicated by the chart reproduced above, the
Committee has set up a special panel which coordinates and reviews
all work relating to ICAO performed by the various specialized divisions and sub-committees of ACC. In addition the United States
representative attends ACC meetings as an observer in order to keep
in touch with the general background of our aviation problems.
The activities and functions of the International Civil Aviation
Organization are of interest to so many different government agencies
that it is impossible to see how, as a practical matter, the United States
Representatives could be efficiently and expeditiously informed and
instructed without such machinery. The first United States representative, Mr. Gerald B. Brophy, and his present successor, Major General
Laurence S. Kuter, have both advised the writer that they attribute
primary responsibility for the success of the United States' participation in the organization to the smooth functioning of the ACC.
This does not mean that there are not improvements that could be
made. The organization in Washington of which ACC is a part has
on various occasions failed to implement decisions reached in ICAO,
even when they have been in accord with ACC recommendations. The
following example is given by General Kuter:
At a meeting in Dublin in early 1946 ICAO's North Atlantic Regional Division decided that thirteen weather ships should be continuously located in the Atlantic to provide the weather observation
aids to navigation and search and rescue services required for safe and
efficient air operations. The ACC agreed, after deliberation, that this
number was correct and that the United States would assume responsibility for seven and one-half of the proposed stations. With the concurrence of a special Treasury representative, the Committee decided
that the stations would be operated by the Coast Guard. Accordingly
our representatives made a corresponding commitment at a special
conference in London. The United States has not only failed to live
up to this commitment, but has actually reduced the number of
weather ships supported by it from four to two. Perhaps this can be
blamed on Congress for failure to make adequate appropriations; more
probably it was the fault of the Treasury, and the ACC, for not seeing
to it that the subject was pressed adequately and in good time.
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The Air Coordinating Committee has itself no direct power to correct such a situation because it is not an operating agency. Yet if its
work is to be effective, some change must be made to make it possible
for it to compel the responsible government departments to make every
effort to carry out policy decisions entered into with the specific approval of those very departments in ACC meetings. Very possibly the
solution of the particular problem of the weather ships will be facilitated by the dramatic rescue by one of them (the "Bibb") of all of
the sixty-nine passengers and crew from a flying boat that recently
made a forced landing halfway between Ireland and Newfoundland.
But the ACC cannot always rely on such a stimulus to produce implementation of its commitments.
Development of United States Position on Multilateral International Agreement Relating to Civil Air Transportation. The work of
the Air Coordinating Committee in this field is really a part of its
responsibilities to ICAO, but it is sufficiently important for special
mention. It illustrates the manner in which the flexible ACC machinery can be adapted to bring to any situation that requires it the recommendations and assistance of the appropriate representatives of
Congress and of the air transport companies.
The entire subject of the proposed multilateral international agreement on commercial rights in international civil air transportation is
too involved to permit a summary in this article. It will be recalled
that after the refusal of most of the nations of the world to accept the
multilateral air transport agreements proposed by the United States
at the Chicago Conferen~e in 1945, each country was obliged to negotiate a series of bilateral agreements with the governments of those
other countries to which its commercial airlines extended, or to which
they wished some day to fly. Although the bilateral pattern has functioned to date in a reasonably satisfactory manner, the governments
of most nations with large air establishments have consistently maintained that a single multilateral agreement is the desirable ultimate
objective. It is hardly necessary to say that the varying situations and
interests of the different countries have made agreement on the form
of such an agreement a matter of the greatest difficulty. It has been
only a little less difficult to reconcile the views of the various public
and private interests in the United States.
The Committee, through a series of meetings and conferences, and
particularly by the hard labor of its Economic Division, has succeeded
in producing a paper which sets forth a coordinated United States
policy, including a draft of a multilateral agreement which would be
acceptable to the United States. It has also approved a "brief" which
is being transmitted by the Department of State to various United
States Embassies explaining our position and providing arguments to
be used as a guide for discussions to achieve support for that position.
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The ACC report was compiled only after the air transport industry
was given opportunity, through the Industry Advisory Panel, to express its views and recommendations, and after discussions with appropriate members of Congress.
In November of this year there is being held in Geneva a special
meeting of the appropriate division of ICAO to consider again the
entire question of a multilateral agreement, and, it is hoped, to-reach
a final conclusion with respect thereto. The Chairman of the United
States delegation is the current Chairman of the Air Coordinating
Committee. There is little doubt that if the United States delegation
accomplishes its objectives, it will be due in no small part to the preliminary work of the ACC.
The "Chosen Instrument" for United States International Commercial Air Transport Operations. Under Section 2 of the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 Congress has specified as being in the public
interest "competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air transportation system properly adapted to the
needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of
As is well.known,
the postal service, and of the national defense."
there are articulate individuals, both within and without the government, who believe that a'policy of competition is not well suited to our
operations in the field of international air transport, and who advocate
the establishment of a single company or a "chosen instrument" for
that purpose. Proponents of this minority view support their position
by citing the experience of England and other countries, and by
various other arguments not here pertinent.
The existing policy, of course, is one that can only be changed by
Congress. In the course of its recent consideration of the McCarran
Bill ("A Bill to Amend the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as Amended,
to Provide for the Creation of a Consolidated International Air Carrier for the United States, and for Other Purposes"), the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce requested the views of the Air
Coordinating Committee. The furnishing of recommendations on
legislation is a specific function of the ACC under Executive Order
9781, and the instance is an example of the value of the Committee in
coordinating and expressing such opinions of the executive departments.
After detailed consideration and study, and after hearing arguments of air-line officials on both sides, the Committee advised the
Chairman of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce that
it was its' unanimous judgment that the existing policy of competition
should be continued. Its letter to Senator White stated: "Experience
to date in both the economic and foreign relations fields warrants the
continuation of competition between United States airlines in the
international field. From the point of view of national, defense, there
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are no factors making a step to the chosen instrument necessary at the
present time. It is considered that the stimulus to progress provided
by competition should be maintained unless and until experience in
the future might prove otherwise."
The proposed Bill was not reported out of the Committee.
Determination of Future Commercial and Military Possibilities of
Lighter-Than-Air Aircraft. Early in its existence the Air Coordinating Committee took under consideration the question of what the
policy of the Government should be with respect to the development
of lighter-than-air aircraft. The Navy Department had advised the
Committee in June 1945 that, on the basis of its experience and experiments before and during the war, it intended to take no action to
initiate a program for the construction and operation of rigid airships
for naval purposes, though if any other Department was interested in
their development and construction for commercial purposes in the
post-war period the Navy would be glad to give full cooperation. The
subject was one of interest and potential importance to the Department
of Commerce, the CAA, the CAB, the Post Office Department, and the
Maritime Commission, as well, of course, as the armed services. When
the matter came to the attention of the President he requested that
the entire subject be turned over to the ACC for discussion and recommendation.
It was obvious that if commercial development of airships was to
be attempted, substantial federal subsidies would be required, and
that this should not be done until an over-all government policy was
formulated. The ACC appointed a sub-committee of technical experts
who in due course produced a thorough study. After extended consideration the Committee concluded that the commercial possibilities
of lighter-than-air aircraft were at the present time so limited that the
public interest would not be served by the development of a lighterthan-air program through Government subsidized sponsorship.
Facilitation of International Travel by Air Passengers. Anyone
who has traveled internationally since World War II is well aware of
the exasperating and delaying formalities and procedures that attend
any crossing of a national boundary. In the case of a man progressing
by air through a number of countries in a few days they may occupy a
substantial percentage of his time, to say nothing of the delays incidefit
to his getting started on his trip in the first place.
In November 1945 the ACC created a standing sub-committee on
the facilitation of international passenger travel by air. Its functions
are "consideration and recommendations with respect to existing
or proposed laws, rules, regulations and procedures covering the fields
of customs, immigration, police, public health and quarantine, military
regulations, civil air regulations, passports and visas, fiscal and exchange facilities, taxation, and airport charges." The subject is a
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further illustration of the manner in which the ACC can bring together
for a common purpose a number of government agencies and other
organizations, no one of which acting alone would have had the ability
-and few if any the inclination-to take appropriate steps to simplify
the lot of the air traveler entering or leaving the United States. In
addition to the regular ACC member agencies, the United States. Public Health Service, the Justice Department (immigration), the Treasury Department (customs) and the Department of Agriculture (entomology and plant quarantine) were accorded full voting status in
these discussions. The Committee also received cooperation from the
Air Transport Association, the International Air Transport Association, the Committee on World Travel Aid, the International Chamber
of Commerce, the National Federation of American Shipping, and
various other organizations including, of course, the international air
transport companies.
It is not necessary to review the committee's accomplishments; suffice it to say that much has been done and that a lot remains. Particular progress has been made in implementing in the United States
uniform international standards and practices recommended by ICAO.
Dimensional Standardization. As international air operations in-

crease the world becomes progressively a much smaller place. Differences among nations and regions in terminologies such as those relating to measurements of distance, speed or time, cause little confusion
to operators of surface transport; in the air the misunderstandings that
such differences may create can easily become a life or death matter.
Advice from the ground to an aircraft in difficulties may vary considerably, depending on whether its distance from a given point has been
furnished in miles or knots or kilometers, or whether the remaining
gasoline supply was understood to have been given in liters or in
gallons. The writer is familiar with a case where a fatal accident was
only narrowly averted when a careless pilot flying on instruments over
mountainous country assumed that altitudes on his chart were expressed in meters instead of in feet. International standardization is of
course a function of the International Civil Aviation Organization.
However, if our weight in that organization is to be effective, an agreed
United States policy is essential. The determination of such a policy
is clearly an appropriate function for the ACC.
This particular subject is one of those on which the ACC has so
far completely failed to produce uniformity among its members. The
failure has not been due to lack of time and study; a special ad hoc
Committee has done the necessary research. *The industry has been
thoroughly canvassed and the question has been debated at length.
There appear to be two schools of thought. The first, supported
by the Department of Commerce, believes that the metric system is
scientifically and arithmetically more adapted to the requirements of
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air navigation;, that since a majority of the nations of the world use
that system its global acceptance is inevitable, and no other is possible.
Commerce argues that we should start now on a program of gradual
conversion to the metric system on the principle that the sooner we
start the sooner we will be completely converted.
The other interested departments, including War and Navy, hold
that an infant industry such as aviation should not try to set a standard
which will inevitably affect many other industries as well. The armed
services believe that unless the metric system is taught in our schools
from the very beginning, the training problem in a national emergency
will be multiplied many times. Our air lines are against any change
from the English system because of the great expense involved in converting. They stress the fact that the English-speaking nations now
operate about eighty per cent of all aircraft flown in the world today.
With the United States sitting on the side lines because of this
disagreement, the ICAO Assembly has adopted a resolution recommending the metric system. Final world standardization will not be
accomplished until such time as the ICAO Council takes action, but
our delay in making up our minds will give the metric nations a lead
in all future council meetings where the matter is discussed. Of course
if the views of the Department of Commerce prevail no harm will have
been done.
Aids to Air Navigation and Landing. Here again the ACC has not

succeeded in bringing about a policy agreement among strongly differing departments. The unresolved dispute has led Congress to make
serious cuts in CAA appropriations for navigational aids. The Congressmen can hardly be blamed for not going overboard on such a
technical subject when the Executive Departments are unable to agree
on which of the two systems they favor. To the layman it may seem
that we are left somewhat in the position of the undecided donkey
standing between two haystacks.
Again the subject is a technical one which need not be reviewed
here. Basically the dispute is between the relative merits of GCA
(Ground Control Approach) and ILS (Instrument Landing System),
or, more simply expressed, between radar and radio. Under the GCA
system the control officer on the ground, with equipment that enables
him to see on a radar screen the exact position of a plane, talks the
blind pilot in to his landing. Under ILS, the plane carries radio
equipment enabling the pilot to determine his position on the glide
path. Some experts assert that the eventual and correct solution will
be that both systems shquld be used, so that one will supplement the
other as local conditions warrant. The only point made here is that,
for one reason or another, the machinery of the ACC has not been
adequate to produce a settlement of the controversy.
This enumeration of examples of ACC operations could be prolonged for many more pages. Perhaps it should include mention of
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its sound advice against a taking over of the operations of TWA by the
Government at the time of the prolonged strike by pilots of that
airline, or of the fact that when the Constellations were grounded in
1946 discussion in the ACC persuaded the War Department of the
advisability of making a limited number of C54's available for our
international carriers so that they did not have to suspend important
services. On the other hand there are cases in addition to those given
above where the ACC has not been able to reach policy agreement on
important questions, such as those involving disputes between the
civil and military departments over the importance of "restricted"
areas, and the operations of airlines in Germany. Differences of
opinion have arisen, and still exist, as to whether or-not the Committee has the right to consider certain important policy questions
which the CAB believes fall within its exclusive jurisdiction. However, for our present purposes of indicating in a general way how the
ACC functions, and how sometimes it does not function, it is believed
.that the foregoing illustrations are sufficient.
V.

STRENGTHENING OF

ACC

MACHINERY

The above necessarily condensed discussion may furnish a background for consideration of the principal questions indicated at the
beginning of this article: Is* some such organizational machinery of
the kind provided by the Air Coordinating Committee necessary or
.advisable to enable the executive branch of the government to formulate and coordinate its gradually developing air policies? If so, what
steps, if any, should be taken to enable that Committee to perform
those functions more efficiently?
It is submitted that the answer to the first of these questions should
be an emphatic affirmative. There is no immediate prospect of a reduction in the number of government agencies and departments that
have responsibility for, or a legitimate interest in, our over-all air
policies. Even if a reorganization were effected-for example by the
creation of a Department of Transportation-it would still be important to provide some administrative mechanism that would bring its
policy makers into close conjunction with those of the Department of
National Defense, the State Department, and other agencies which
now participate in the Air Coordinating Committee.
The point has been made that in the substantial majority of the
cases .that have been brought before the ACC the question involved
has usually been one of the formulation of a policy rather than the
coordination of conflicting policies previously adopted by the member
agencies. If this distinction is important, it in no way lessens the need
for the machinery.
It is quite clear that the Cabinet itself is not an appropriate forum
for the consideration and determination of the type of problem we have
been considering except in unusual cases,'and then only after pre-
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digestion by the ACC or some similar committee. The top Secretaries
have neither the time, nor in many cases the specialized knowledge,
to enable them to assume such added burdens. We are probably a
long distance away from the establishment of a Cabinet secretariat,
or an appropriate White House staff, that could do the job better than
it has been done by the ACC. Experience has demonstrated that to
let each department or agency go its own way results either in travel
in a good many directions at once or no movement at all. Particularly
during the critically important years that lie ahead of us we must do
all we can to encourage and stimulate concerted action among our air
leaders, and to prevent any group from charting or pursuing a course
that does not fit in with the best interests of the whole.
The second question calls for a fuller answer. It can best be given
by taking a square look at the weaknesses of the ACC's present set-up.
First, the Committee has no efficient way of settling acute differences of opinion among its members. The form of organization originally proposed in 1945 by the Assistant Secretary of War for Air
would have remedied this lack by making use of the powers given by
Congress to the Office of the Director of War' Mobilization and
Reconversion. It will be remembered that this plan was rejected
because of the strong opposition of certain of the Departments. Under
Executive Order 9781 the Committee is required to submit to the
President "those important aviation questions the disposition of which
is prevented by the inability of the agencies concerned to agree."
This of course furnishes a method of ending disputes, but as a practical
matter since the Executive Order was issued no questions have actually been taken to the President for settlement. When there is lack
of uniformity the matter is usually allowed to drag along in a state
of stalemate, perhaps with the hope that a compromise can ultimately
be reached. Frequently it is finally reached only at the cost of substantial delay.
Second, the Committee has no power of its own to implement its
policy decisions and see that they are carried out. The theory of its
operations has been that if all interested departments and agencies
vote in favor of a certain course of action, one or more of those departments or agencies will have the power to take steps to ensure that
action results, and will promptly of its own initiative exercise that
power. This has not always worked out in practice. Neither the
Chairman nor the staff of the ACC can in such cases do more than
try to follow up and remind; it is not reasonable to expect them, or
any other member of the Committee, to run to the White House with
tales of the delinquencies of a fellow member. It is not easy to suggest
a simple remedy for this situation because there are obvious reasons
against the creation of an 'entity that would have the power to issue
directives to established government departments.
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Third, the Committee has no full-time Chairman. Its original staff
of one Secretary has been expanded since 1945 so that now, as mentioned above, it has a secretariat of eighteen with an Executive Secretary in charge. The Chairman, however, is one of the
Assistant Secretaries of State and the Co-Chairman is Chairman of the
CAB. The regular duties of each make it impossible for either to give
primary attention to the ACC. It is axiomatic in Washington that any
"coordinating" committee operating under a rule that permits a veto
by a single departments starts life under a handicap that inevitably
retards its growth and effectiveness. When this disadvantage is increased by provision for a part-time chairman from one of the interested departments it is the exception rather than the rule that the
organization will live long and prosper. If one remembers the pressing
work that has daily loaded the desks of such a chairman in his own
department or agency, it is rather remarkable that the Committee has
accomplished the results that it has.
Fourth, and perhaps as a result of the other three defects, the Committee has not held the position of prestige and strength that the
importance of its subject-matter demands. The fact that primary
jurisdiction over aviation matters is balkanized among several virile
but totally separate agencies makes it necessary that the only coordinating organization have equal standing; it must conduct itself so
that it does not usurp functions which by statute are made the duty
and responsibility of the individual units, but it should be strong
enough to command respect for its decisions and in one way or
another ensure that they are complied with. It must, moreover, be
so set up that it does not fall prey to the inertia that is so frequently a
characteristic of the committee-type of organization. We need a driving and continuously active national air-policy group; it will not be
practicable for the President to appoint a temporary policy commission
of private citizens each time a crisis arises.
At the last session of Congress a bill (H.R. 2220) was introduced
by Representative Hinshaw designed to cure the foregoing deficiencies
and give a "National Aviation Council" (which would be the successor to the Air Coordinating Committee) a statutory foundation.
The purpose of the Council was to be "unifying and clarifying national
policies relating to aviation and the maintenance of adequate industrial
resources required to keep aviation an effective instrument for the
national security and the support of world peace, of adapting such
policies to new circumstances and recommending revisions thereof and
of monitoring and harmonizing the pertinent activities of the executive branch of Government in accordance with such policies." The
proposed Council was to have membership generally similar to that
of the present ACC, but with the important addition of a full-time
Chairman to be appointed by the President with the approval of the
Senate. Provision was made for an Advisory Board of ten representing
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air transport, the aviation manufacturing industry, labor, private flying,
research and development and aeronautical education. The proposed
machinery differed materially from that of the ACC in that the powers'
conferred upon the Council were to be exercised by a majority of its
members. In addition, the Chairman was to be empowered to recommend to the President the establishment of policies without the approval of other members of the Council.
In the ACC's report on the bill two major criticisms were made.
First, objection was raised to the majority vote provision. Chairman
Landis pointed out to the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee
of the House that under such a procedure it might often be the case
that the agency which is responsible for the execution of a given policy
under consideration by the Council had been given that responsibility
by Congress. This agency might find itself in the minority, and be
thus required to carry out statutory responsibilities in a mariner which
it considered unwise. Aside from the probability of serious statutory
conflicts, Chairman Landis felt that the responsible agency's position
on the issue concerning.which it found itself in the minority might be
derived in part at least from important considerations which lie outside the field of aviation. In such a case he felt that the agency's
over-all policy might be determined by the National Aviation Council
to the prejudice of the national interest.
The second chief criticism by the ACC was directed at the provision for the independent Chairman. It was felt that serious harm
might result from the casting of a deciding vote by one who was not
otherwise responsible for the operation of a federal agency and who, if
the decision was adverse to him, could appeal the matter independently
and directly to the President. The ACC stated that in its opinion it
would be preferable for the Chairman to be selected from the Council's
agency membership and that all powers given the Chairman by the
proposed bill should be centered in the Council.
There is certainly merit to the first of these two objections. The
validity of the second is more questionable.
It is submitted that very serious consideration should be given to
an amendment of the existing Executive Order so as to provide for a
permanent Chairman of the ACC who would not be attached to any
of the interested departmental agencies but would instead be a member of the White House staff and, in effect, a representative of the
President. This would accomplish several results. It would give the
work of the Committee the stimulus and continuity that can only come
from the existence of a full-time head personally charged with the
responsibility of making the machinery function smoothly and expeditiously. It would avoid the somewhat anomalous situation resulting from placing this responsibility on a member of one of the departments whose interest in the field of aviation, while great, may be
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no greater than that of various 6f the others represented on the Committee.5 A Chairman recognized as a representative of the President
would give the Committee a prestige that it does not now enjoy in
sufficient degree. It is fair to say that the mere fact that such an
appointee sat at the head of the table would have a healthy effect on
the energy of the representatives of the various- departments in the
performance of their share in the Committee's work.
In addition, such an arrangement would facilitate the settlement
of disputes, and go a long way towards ensuring that decisions would
be implemented by appropriate department action. The rule of the
unanimous vote should be allowed to stand, but a simpler method
should be provided for bringing important disputes promptly to the
attention of the President so that where necessary they could be settled
without delay. Likewise, in cases 'where a department was negligent in
carrying out policies agreed to by its representative on the ACC, appropriate action could be taken through the President's office-in fact,
in many cases the mere presence of a Chairman from the White House
staff would of itself encourage rapid compliance.
There are undoubtedly arguments that can be advanced against
the foregoing suggestion. Chief of these is the contention that a fulltime Chairman, sitting as the representative of the President, and with
ready access to him, would bring about a situation where the heads
of the various interested departments would be by-passed. This need
not follow. If the position were filled by the right man he would take
pains not to refer an important question to the Chief Executive without first discussing it with the cabinet member or members directly
concerned, and without seeing to it that they had an equal opportunity,
if they so elected, to present their views.
It is not surprising to find that the provision of the present Executive Order permitting disputes to be referred to the President for decision has not been utilized. As a practical matter dissident members
of the ACC will not find the President able to reconcile or settle their
differences unless he has a special assistant to analyze the facts for
him and assist him in their consideration. No one can render this
essential aid to the President better than a member of his own office
who has attended all ACC meetings and who is charged with responsibility for the success of the Committee's work. In essence the plan
would tend to make the role of the ACC more nearly approximate
the one that it is most logical for it to assume, namely that of a part
of the President's own staff. Just as the President presides at meetings
of the Cabinet it would seem appropriate for his representative to
5 The appointment of an Assistant Secretary of State as Chairman of the
original ACC in 1945 was due in part to the fact that at that time most of the
difficult problems awaiting consideration involved international relations, and in
part to the State Department's view that it could not go along with the plan
unless it held the chairmanship. Neither of these situations apply today, though
a large number of the Committee's cases still have an important element of
foreign relations.
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preside at meetings of groups that could naturally operate as sub-committees of the Cabinet. It would probably not be wise to go so far as
to give such a representative the right to exercise himself the powers of
decision that are vested in the President; such a result could not, in
any event, be brought about without legislation similar to that which
delegated like power to the Director of the Office of War Mobilization
and Reconversion. It would be sufficient to have as Chairman a man
who had close direct contacts with the office of the Chief Executive
and who would also not have particular affiliations with any one of
the interested departments.
A second argument against the plan is that it would transform the
ACC into a new government agency, thus further increasing the already
large number involved in the air picture. Again the objection hardly
seems valid. The step would in no way change the basic principles
upon which the ACC is organized. It would merely ensure the more
efficient and more expeditious operation of its machinery without giving it a single power or duty that it does not already have.
Perhaps the basic underlying objection that is held, consciously or
subconsciously, by those government departments which dislike the
idea of a full-time Chairman is that he might bring about a situation
that would tend to curtail their individual activities in certain ways.
To state this objection is really to answer it. To the extent that such
curtailment is necessary in order to bring about agreement on and
enforcement of government-wide policies, it should be encouraged
rather than discouraged.
On the question of whether the ACC should be recreated by statute
or continued on its present Executive Order status there does not seem
to be any controlling argument either way. One of the obvious benefits that would result from such legislation by Congress is that it would
undoubtedly give the Committee added prestige. In order, however, to
preserve its important status as a part of the executive rather than of
the legislative machinery it would be definitely preferable for it to be
organized in such a way that it headed up to and reported to the
President rather than to the Congress.
It should be made clear that the comments in the foregoing paragraphs that may appear to be in some respects critical of the ACC are
made only for the purpose of focusing attention on certain steps that
might be taken to increase its present usefulness. Of the importance
of continuing it in one form or another there should be no doubt;
neither can anyone question the value of the contribution that has
been made by its members and its hard-working secretariat in the two
and a half years of its existence. It is to be hoped that its accomplishments will be recognized and its importance stressed by the two aviation commissions that will render public reports within the next few
months.
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There are few subjects more closely related to the future well-being
of the Nation and its international relationships than those of civil
and military aviation. Our air power must be the very cornerstone
of our entire system of national defense. Equally important, it must
be recognized that safe and rapid air transportation to all parts of the
globe, available to all people, will eventually do more to create the
international understanding for which we all yearn than many years
of international conferences. The present generation may not live to
see it, but the day will surely come when historians will record the fact
that it was the air that finally brought the peoples of the world together.
The United States is destined for many reasons to play a leading part
in this great future development, and its own air progress must never
be handicapped by lack of coordinated policies and clear-cut objectives.
To a greater extent than is often realized, the success of a commanding
general depends on the inconspicuous work of a well managed and
energetic staff.

